A nation’s foreign policy is determined by its internal dynamics. The state of Pakistan faces numerous challenges in upholding its foreign policy and prioritizing its national interest. Pakistan, which has been left with one significant internal factor—economic inadequacy manifested as debt—still adheres to this type of traditional description.
The enormity of foreign debt sounds terrifying. According to the State Bank of Pakistan’s External Debt and Liabilities Report 2024, as of September 30, 2024, Pakistan’s total external debt and liabilities amounted to US$133.455 billion.
In contrast to its foreign exchange liabilities of US$12.042 billion, Pakistan owed US$6.99 billion to the Paris Club, US$39.903 billion to multilateral donors, US$9.246 billion to the IMF, and US$6.800 billion to international bonds such Eurobonds and Sukuks.
Pakistan was proud in the 1980s to have a sizable exportable labor force of laborers and semi-skilled workers working in Arab nations. However, this trend was weakened by two causes. First, a number of workforce types became obsolete as machines progressively replaced humans in the labor market.
Second, the majority of Pakistan’s vocational schools were forced to close due to student politics. By 2025, Arab nations would need highly qualified and skilled labor, which will reduce their reliance on Pakistan. However, a lot of Pakistanis are still holding onto the hope of making foreign exchange. As a result, a large portion of Pakistan’s labor force is found begging in some Arab nations, both on the streets and in shopping centers. European nations are not physically accessible, while Arab nations are.
Pakistan is forced to adapt to external dynamics due to economic insufficiency, which defies the traditional notion of foreign policy. Pakistan’s international status was minimized on January 20. Donald Trump, the recently elected president of the United States (US), did not ask anyone from Pakistan to attend his oath-taking ceremony.
Pakistan’s declining significance in the near future was indicated by this exclusion. As a result, outside forces have the potential to reshape Pakistan’s foreign policy. There are several difficulties when dynamics are external.
The question of whether the military or the civilian administration had more authority over foreign policy was a topic of continuous discussion in Pakistan years ago. The word “superiority” has now been removed. Foreign policy is determined by international events that are overseen by the United States, and neither the military nor the civilian government has any actual control over it.
China, India, and nations in Europe and the Arab world are the next external players. Pakistan’s foreign policy has become reactive in response to this issue, allowing other nations to push their national interests over its own. Pakistan attempts to find flexibility in this statement to protect its national interests, falling just short of having its own foreign policy. Pakistan is in this depressing position as a result of economic inadequacy.
The year 2025 suggests that global circumstances have evolved. When it comes to taxes, tariffs, and penalties, Trump is not holding back. The goal of Pakistan’s attempt to appease the Trump administration through Saudi Arabia might not be achieved. It’s interesting to note that US foreign policy is also influenced by economic insufficiency. Trump has made a firm request for Saudi Arabia to invest $1 trillion in the United States.
Saudi Arabia has swiftly agreed in return, indicating that Pakistan’s sponsor is a subordinate as well. India’s trade surplus with the US is US$35 billion. In order to maintain a fair bilateral commercial relationship, Trump has also pushed India to purchase more American-made weapons and to refund any excess commerce. Like Saudi Arabia, India complies. This development begs the question of how useful Pakistan is to the Trump administration.
With Pakistan’s economic insufficiency, two points are relevant. First, during Trump’s previous presidential tenure (Jan 2017 to Jan 2021), the haste with which Pakistan repatriated Indian pilot Abhinandan Varthaman in early March 2019, after succumbing to US pressure, spoke volumes about Pakistan’s inability to resist, thereby losing the option of being a sovereign actor.
Second, on New Year’s Eve 2018, through a tweet, Trump lamented doling out US$33 billion in aid over the past 15 years, receiving little in return except “lies and deceit,” portraying Pakistan as a treacherous ally of the US. Now, in the immediate aftermath of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the ramifications of Pakistani military officials visiting Kabul in September 2021 and sipping tea—interpreted in adverse ways—have yet to surface, exposing the gulf of mistrust between Pakistan and the US .
The opportunity for Pakistan to pursue an active (or proactive) foreign policy has all but vanished. Whether Pakistan want to send a friendly or hostile message across its borders, the only independent maneuvering space it has is when it comes to Gwadar decisions or missile testing. The remainder is merely reactive.
In other words, for Pakistan to respond and define any aspect of its foreign policy, an outside event must take place. For example, Pakistan may side with Tajikistan if Afghanistan disregards its pleas. Pakistan can improve relations with Bangladesh if India makes an effort to become friends with Afghanistan.
However, there is a serious worry that Pakistan’s room for reaction is dwindling as the global scene becomes more and more focused on economics.
